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Introduction 
 
The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was an epoch-making event within the post-colonial 
order of South Asia. Led by the middle classes, a bitter and bloody war of Liberation 
from Pakistan was fought, based on Bangladeshi peoples’ aspirations for democracy, 
identity and for a more progressive society. Bangladesh’s emergence as an 
independent secular state effectively shattered the ‘two nation theory’ that had formed 
the basis for the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and demonstrated that religion alone 
was not sufficient to forge a cohesive national identity. The new state of Bangladesh 
was the product of a ‘Bengali nationalism’ that arose to challenge West Pakistan’s 
economic exploitation of its Eastern wing, its attempt to impose religious hegemony, 
and its repression of Bengali political voice.1   
 
Yet this experiment with secularism was short-lived. After the 1975 
assassination of Bangladesh’s founder Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the military rulers 
made political use of Islam in an attempt to create legitimacy and divert attention 
away from the country’s increasingly pressing economic problems. But the political 
ideals of secular Bengali nationalism continued to find expression within the new 
political systems that emerged in Bangladesh. The ideals of the earlier Liberation 
struggle co-existed with these efforts to construct new identities around ‘Bangladeshi 
nationalism’ that had Islam at their core, with the result that the ruling political elites 
continue to contest both ‘Bengali’ and ‘Bangladeshi’ visions of nationalism. This 
working paper argues that identity formation in Bangladesh is neither instrumental nor 
primordial, but has instead drawn on a range of complex factors that include ‘Bengali 
culture’, ‘religion’ and ‘socio-economic modes’. Through a survey of relevant 
literature and some recent fieldwork in Bangladesh, the paper hopes to illuminate the 
evolution of nationalism in Bangladesh and its array of potentially confusing 
identities. 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Identity may be an essential component of a nation, but it remains an essentially 
contested concept within political theory. Language, religion, culture, shared history, 
ethnicity or citizenship has each been variously upheld to provide the foundation that 
gives rise to the feeling of nationhood (Sen, 2006). What constitutes the ‘imagination’ 
of a nation is therefore debatable. The problem may become even more acute when 
we consider the developing world with its heterogeneous populations. Anti-colonial 
nationalism provided only temporary coherence to identities in such countries, which 
soon faced multifarious problems of fragmentation in terms of ethnicity, religion and 
region (Huntington 1997). With the disappearance of the ‘other’, in the form of the 
colonial master, the veneer of unity holding disparate communities together as nations 
soon started giving way to more fragmentary tendencies. Nations were plunged into 
the vortex of military dictatorship, religious resurgence or ethnic backlash. The crisis 
of legitimacy which followed the erosion of the anti-colonial nationalistic hegemony 
was redressed by harping back to primordial religious or ethnic identities, or by 
resorting to military repression, or combinations of both. 
                                                 
1 Bangladesh’s struggle for Liberation led to the country’s foundation based on the four pillars of secularism, 
socialism, democracy and nationalism. 
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Gramsci’s Selections from the Prison Notebooks considers the ways that ruling 
elites tend to construct the ethos and values of society to secure their vested socio-
political interests, and he suggests that political civil society ‘hegemonises’ 
nationalistic values in support of ruling objectives (Gramsci 1971). Following from 
this argument, the Bangladeshi ruling elites have constructed both ‘Bengali 
nationalist’ and ‘Bangladeshi nationalist’ identities in support of both the right to self-
determination and their own ruling objectives over the years, but with little reference 
at all to the subaltern class. 
 
Within the short span of 25 years, Bangladesh had undergone two different 
national movements - the first taking place in 1947 which led to the creation of 
Pakistan, and the second in 1971 which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh and its 
secession from Pakistan. These two moments of violent rupture both impacted upon 
the fashioning of identities, but each in different ways. After 1947 there was the 
confusing situation of the old being dead, and the new not yet being born. During this 
interregnum, the national political space in East Bengal was occupied by various 
combinations of secularism, socialism, democracy and linguistic nationalism. Later, 
after 1971, came the military dictatorships and the rise of a more strident Islamic 
hegemony. During this period new heroes were made and old ones replaced, symbols 
and myths were created and then torn apart, and history was continually written and 
re-written in the search to imagine a nation in ways that overcame the underlying 
deep-rooted contradictions.2  
 
Within such complex and changing circumstances, the study of nationalism 
and identities becomes particularly challenging. How can we now understand the 
range of identities with which Bangladesh heads towards the future? Are its secularist 
roots entirely dead, or does civil society have enough resilience to thwart potentially 
uncivil elements within what some observers have seen as an Islamic resurgence? 
This paper is an attempt to explore the trajectories of secularist and religious identities 
in Bangladesh. While the idea of secular Bengali nationalism was important in events 
leading up to the Liberation struggle of 1971, identities have since moved on. In 
particular, an erosion of secular trends began soon after the birth of Bangladesh, and 
subsequently both military and democratic regimes have attempted to reshape 
religious identities. 
 
                                                 
2 For example, politicians such as Maulana Akram Khan, Abul Qasim Fazlul Haq and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy 
were each products of the old pre-Partition politics, and did not contribute to the struggle for Bangladesh. Even Maulana 
Bhashani’s role was marginalized. Instead, it was the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters) who made the main contribution to 
fighting against the Pakistan army, and who successfully liberated the country. Sheikh Mujib Rahman emerged as the main 
political leader. The atrocities committed by the Pakistan army against civilians was a key mobilizing factor that led people to 
fight for freedom. 1971 became the starting point of the new country’s history. But after Liberation, Mujib and his party became 
authoritarian. Soon the sacrifices and atrocities were forgotten, and people were denied participation within the new power 
structure. See Samaddar (2002) for an account of Bangladesh immediately after the War of Liberation, and the use of myth-
making to strengthen some groups in power and exclude others. The author raises the question of how Bangladeshi nationalism 
should in fact be be defined. If language becomes the basis of nationhood, how should West Bengal, which is now a part of India, 
be treated? To escape from this paradox, some now deny the idea of ‘Bengali nationalism’ in favour of ‘Bangladeshi 
nationalism’. This, according to Samaddar, has brought religion back as an element in the construction of national identity. 
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The following major issues each need to be considered: the history of the 
Islamisation of Bengal, essential to understand the roots of Islam in Bengal; the 
emergence of Bengali culture, most specifically the impact of language on 
crystallizing a distinct identity; the partition of 1905 and then subsequently in 1947 
following the ‘two nation theory’; the Language Movement in the erstwhile East 
Pakistan which challenged the political idea of Islam as a sufficient glue capable of 
uniting the two wings of Pakistan; and finally the War of Liberation in 1971 which 
resulted in the birth of Bangladesh and put forth the secularist resistance to 
discrimination under the garb of religious hegemony. The resurgence of Islam after 
the 9/11 attacks in the US, and the growth Middle East-funded Madrasa schools are 
also important factors. The outcome of the Ninth Parliamentary Election in 
Bangladesh in 2008 has once again revived the hopes for the creation of a secular 
nation state. All this of course also needs to be understood within the context of 
Bangladesh’s fragile economy and continuing mass poverty. 
 
 
Shaping primordial identities 
 
In the pre-modern era, Bengal was populated predominantly by indigenous social 
groups, who worshipped their own cultural-religious deities. As M. H. Klaiman 
observed ‘the descendants of non-Bengali tribals of a few centuries past now 
comprise the bulk of Bengali speakers’. In other words, the vast majority of the 
Bengali linguistic community today represents present or former inhabitants of the 
previously uncultivated and culturally unassimilated tracts of eastern Bengal (Klaiman 
1990; Baxter 1997). These people depended on shifting cultivation systems, and were 
unaware of more advanced techniques of agriculture for their survival. In the early 
Vedic period, the arrival of Indo Aryans groups from the north-western parts of the 
Indian sub-continent began to influence these indigenous people economically and 
culturally, as they began settling mainly in the north western part of the deltaic land of 
Bengal (Thaper 1989). This brought strong social hierarchies to the north-western 
Bengal’s indigenous people on the basis of Brahmanical socio-cultural beliefs. The 
Indo-Aryans also brought with them collections of Sanskrit literature, a new calendar 
and additional knowledge of agriculture, all of which influenced the socio-economic 
and cultural life of indigenous people in the delta (Bose and Jalal 2004).  As Eaton 
(1993) explains:  
 
‘The literature produced towards the end of the migratory process reveals a 
hierarchically ordered society headed by a hereditary priesthood, the Brahmans, and 
sustained by an ideology of ritual purity and pollution that conferred a pure status on 
Indo-Aryans while stigmatizing non-Aryans as impure ‘barbarians’. 
 
Many of the more eastern deltaic indigenous tribes of Bengal remained 
secluded from these influences. Eaton (1993) continues: 
 
‘The Indo-Aryan groups gradually settled the upper, the middle, and finally 
the lower Ganges region, retroactively justifying each movement by pushing further 
eastward the frontier separating themselves from tribes they ritually considered 
unclean. As this occurred, both Indo-Aryans and the indigenous communities with 
which they came in contact underwent considerable cultural change’.  
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Indo-Aryan socio-cultural influences remained mostly in the north-western 
part of the delta until the conquest of Mohammad Bakhtiyar in 1204 A.D. His 
invasion marked the onset of a new phase of identity formation in Bengal, in which 
people in the east of the delta gradually came under the influence of Islamic cultural 
values and mosque patronage. An economic dynamism followed from the 
transformation of the area as the Indo-Aryans introduced and instilled the technique of 
wet-rice farming and organized cultivation.3  Both Brahmanical socio-cultural 
influences and those of Perso-Islamic religious preachers under the mosque patronage 
helped bring forward the idea of organizing family and farming system. Therefore, the 
spread of Islamic religious-cultural expansion is also deeply enrooted with the 
spreading of the techniques of agriculture and wet rice production in pre-modern 
Bengal. Both Brahmins and Mullahs were instrumental in teaching new methods of 
agriculture linked with eastward expansion of these two distinct religious faiths, 
which loosely centred around ‘Hindu culture’ patronized within Brahmanical 
hierarchical social orders, and ‘the Islamic culture’ patronized by mosque or Dargah. 
Islamic culture was predominantly influenced by Sufism, which was linked with the 
process of de-forestation and agricultural expansion, had developed inclusive cultural 
values in Bengali society (Bose and Jalal 2004). Within this historical perspective we 
can see that the economic imperatives of survival played a central role in the 
formation of socio-cultural identities in pre-modern Bengal. Eaton (1993) also points 
out that 
 
‘only in Bengal a majority of the indigenous population have adopted the 
religion of the ruling class, ‘Islam’ in the garb of mosque patronages. The significant 
role was played by village mosques and shrines in the diffusion of Mughal authority 
and Islamic values in the region’.  
 
            However, the Mughal authorities did normally intervene directly in the 
religious affairs of any community, and recruited their officials from across all the 
different religious communities. For example, the Mughals protected the Marwadi4 
businessman community settling in Bengal, who provided the main source of military 
funds.   
 
 
The evolution of a syncretic culture 
 
The result was that culture and society in Bengal evolved with a set of syncretic 
values that emphasised religious inclusion. This was the result of a longstanding 
tolerance among the people of this deltaic region in relation to a wide range of 
influences that included Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Sufism and Tantrik cultures, 
each of which had been accommodated within indigenous tribal cultures.5  Within this 
syncretic Bengali society, one could still identify longstanding forms of worship from 
pre-modern Bengal. Brahmanical and Islamic identities seeped into the layers of 
society and created a distinct culture in Bengal such that there was a co-existence 
                                                 
3 This has also given the idea of territoriality in early Bengal, along with the Indo-Aryan and Terko-Islamic cultural 
values. 
4 A Hindu business community, originating from the Marwad region of present Rajasthan in India. 
5 Discussion with Professor Imtiaz Ahmad, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
7 
between old and new religious practices. This meeting of Islamic and indigenous 
cultures went on to create the world’s second largest Muslim ethnic community.  
 
The differentiation of identities within Bengali society is therefore a relatively 
modern concept. To the modern mind, religion appears as a fixed identity where there 
are specific and well-defined beliefs and practices. Islam has been so finely woven in 
the Bengali fabric that it is almost impossible to determine where one thread coming 
from local beliefs, and another from Islamic belief, begins and ends. This helped to 
create a unique Bengali Muslim identity different from other Islamic cultures, where 
Muslims and Hindus could venerate common deities and holy men (Pirs), and pay 
tributes to the same shrines (Mazars) (Anisuzzaman 2002). The ideas and practices of 
Yoga, Tantric and Natha cults all gained popularity across both these main religious 
communities. Some Muslims produced literature that drew on Vaishnava themes, and 
others recognized the Vedas as books sent by God, or claimed that Yoga was also 
taught by Prophet Muhammad (Anisuzzaman 2002). 
 
Moreover, the frontier people of the eastern delta did not seem to have viewed 
Islam as an alien or closed system, to be accepted or rejected as a whole. Religions 
were far from being the ‘culture-boxes’ with well-defined boundaries that they seem 
to be today. A static understanding of religion cannot therefore be applied to the pre-
modern Bengal frontier, which was a fluid context in which Islamic and other beliefs 
seeped into a set of local cosmologies that were themselves dynamic. During the 
Islamisation process in Bengal, this ‘seepage’ occurred over such a long period of 
time that one can at no point identify a specific moment of ‘conversion’, or any single 
moment when people saw themselves as making a dramatic break with past beliefs 
(Eaton 1993). A gradual process of identification with an indigenous higher god 
slowly displaced the indigenous cosmology and the monotheistic ideal of Islam 
gradually became the norm. 
 
Islam in Bengal absorbed local culture and became profoundly identified with 
Bengal’s long-term processes of agrarian expansion. During its formative years, the 
cultivating classes did not seem to have regarded Islam as ‘foreign’ - even though 
some Muslim and Hindu literati and foreign observers did occasionally take such a 
view (Pattnaik 2005). As late as the early twentieth century, Muslim cultivators 
retained indigenous names like Chand, Pal, and Dutt. In the context of pre-modern 
Bengal, then, it would seem inappropriate to speak of the ‘conversion’ of ‘Hindus’ to 
Islam. What one finds, rather, is an expanding agrarian civilization, whose cultural 
counterpart was the growth of the cult of Allah. In 1908, the Gazetteer of Khulna 
District noted that the Muslim masses ‘are descendents of semi-Hinduized aborigines, 
principally Chandals and Pods’ who ‘do not, however, know or admit that they are the 
descendants of converts to Islam; according to them they are the tillers of the soul’ 
(Eaton 1993). In the evolution of this identity, there was a strong element of 
syncretism arising from religious intermingling, sharing of linguistic heritage and 
cultural commonalities.6  
                                                 
6 For example: Ray Mangala, written in 1686, praises both Dakshin Ray and Muslim pioneer Badi Ghazi Khan. The 
literatures that are prominent were Ananta Badu Chandidas’s Srikrisna Kirtana, Ramayan by Kritivasa and Srikrisna Vijaya by 
Maladhara Vasu. The Pachali poems on local Gods and Goddess appeared towards the end of the fifteenth century which drew 
from the cultural climate and physical geography of Bengal (for details, see Tarafdar 1965). Nabi Vamsi by Sultan Saiyid 
depicted Krishna as one of the prophets (for details, see Bhattacharya 1999). Nur Tattwa is another literature that talked of the 
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Islamic and non-Islamic frontiers  
 
The Perso-Islamic politico-cultural expansion in the region formed two social classes 
within the Muslims of Bengal, the ‘Ashraf’ and the ‘Atraf’.7 The Ashraf were viewed 
as the ruling class of Muslim society characterized by Perso-Arabic cultural values.  
The Atrafs were considered to be lower professional Muslim classes, who had 
originated from indigenous people mostly from the south eastern parts of Bengal. 
Ashrafs did not tend to share this view (Anisuzzaman 2002). The rural masses saw 
themselves as good Muslims because they cultivated the soil, while the Ashraf as non-
cultivators disdained the plough. Members of the Ashraf class typically viewed their 
ancestors as people who had come to Indian sub-continent to administer a vast 
empire, and not to join indigenous peasant fellow cultivators. Herein lay the basis of a 
social cleavage between rural Muslims and non-cultivating Ashraf that had further 
widened in the context of the political and religious movements of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (Eaton 1993). 
 
The Ashrafs historically have also controlled and warned the ruling class of 
Muslims to deal with infidels and keep them away from key ruling responsibilities. 
This brought occasional tensions between the Turkish religious leaders and the 
Hindus in Bengal. By the end of the fourteenth century, the Sufis and the Firdausis 
ordered that the rulers should not reduce participation from Hindus and retain the 
Islamic character. Maulana Muzzafar Shams, a Sufi of the Firdausi order, wrote to 
Sultan Ghiyath al-Din A’zam Shah stating:  
 
‘The vanquished unbelievers with heads hanging down exercise their power 
and authority to administer the lands which belong to them. But they have also been 
appointed (executive) officers over the Muslims in the lands of Islam, and they 
impose their orders on them. Such things should not happen’.8 
 
Another example of such tensions the rise of powerful nobles such as the Raja 
Ganesh dynasty. Raja Ganesh hailed from the ruling families of the former Pala and 
Sena rulers and had a great influence due to his ownership of vast and rich deltaic 
lands. Raja Ganesh became very powerful, but there is still no absolute agreement 
amongst historians as to whether Raja Ganesh actually usurped the throne or not. Raja 
Ganesh did not tamper with the basic ideals of the administration and polity which 
was then over two centuries old. In order to reduce tensions between Turks and 
Bengalis he arranged for his son to convert to Islam, becoming known as Sultan Jalal 
al-Din Muhammad, and later ruling as a Muslim king (Eaton 1993). While there was a 
divide between Islamic and non-Islamic groups at the upper level among the ruling 
classes, the masses were left relatively free to practice their religious beliefs, even 
during the Mughal period. Unlike any other Muslim society, even today in 
Bangladesh, irrespective of their religion, women wear the Bindi red spot normally 
associated with Hindu traditions. In reality, Bengal evolved characteristics that were 
                                                                                                                                            
syncretic tradition of Bengal. Apart from this common literature, both Hindus and Muslims also revered goddesses such as Bon 
Bibi and Sitala (also see Pattnaik 2005). 
7 The small but influential class of mainly urban Muslims who perpetuated the Mughals’ ruling-class mentality, 
cultivated Urdu and Persian, and typically claimed ancestral origins from the west of the delta (for details, see Jahan 2002). 
8 Muzzafar Shams Balkhi, Maktubat-I Muzaffar Shams Balkhi (Persian MS., Acc. No.1859, Khuda Baksh Oriental 
Public Library, Patna), Letter 163, p. 509. See also Askari (1956). 
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different both from other parts of northern India and unlike the Middle East from 
where the rulers hailed. At the same time, processes of Hindu-Muslim differentiation 
at the upper levels were pursued by the British colonial rulers from the nineteenth 
century under their policy of ‘divide and rule’.    
 
 
The colonial period: the growth of Islamic consciousness 
 
The reformist movements in both Hinduism and Islam contributed to a consolidation 
of the distinct religious identities of the two communities. The Hindus in upper India 
started the Shudhi and Sangathan movements and the Muslims started Tabligh, 
Tanzeems, Firduasi and Sufis mostly in the Indian sub-continent. In Bengal, the 
Wahabi, Farzai and Tarika-e-Mohammad movements such as those represented by 
Titu Mir and Haji Shariatullah helped to give a distinct identity to Bengali Muslims. 
These were conservative schools of thought that stressed ‘purist Islam’ and urged the 
Muslims to give up Sufi practices (Ahmed 1998). At the same time, reform 
movements in Hindu society also created divergence. The idea of Islam and non-Islam 
as closed systems with definite boundaries is itself largely a product of these 
nineteenth and twentieth century reform movements. For most rural Bengalis during 
the pre-modern period, the line that separated ‘non-Islam’ from ‘Islam’ appeared to 
have been quite porous and shifting. Popular literature dating from the seventeenth 
century, such as the Mymensingh ballads, was popular amongst both communities 
who remained remarkably open to accepting any sort of religious ideas around 
agency, human or superhuman, that might assist them in coping with life’s everyday 
problems (Eaton 1993). Yet in the background, the influences of British policy, and of 
religious movements, began to create and reinforce ideas of difference between 
Hindus and Muslims in Bengal. 
 
  
Shaping socio-economic frontiers  
 
Tensions around land ownership within the Bengali Hindu community helped feed 
processes of differentiation. In the north-western parts of Bengal, a predominantly 
Hindu class of Zamindar landlords existed along with a business class and an 
educated-middle class. In the south-eastern deltaic region of Bengal, on the other side, 
was the majority of Muslim settlers who remained mainly poor peasant tenants, or 
artisans working as tailors, dyers, masons, furniture makers, silkworm rearers, 
weavers and sailors and were considered lower class. 
 
The British colonial policies played further upon these differences. The East 
India Company control of Bengal began with the defeat of a Muslim ruler Nawab 
Sirajudola in the battle of Pilasi in 1757. At first, the British took over revenue 
administration in 1765 and the Hindu trading class developed a friendly relationship 
with the company’s officials (Chandra 2009). The wealth they had accumulated was 
reinvested in the land as Zamindars. The urban population was also primarily drawn 
from the professional and trading classes, consisting of high caste Hindus such as 
Brahmans, Kayasthas and Baidyas. Later, the British turned to this class to try to 
create a reformist landlord class of ‘gentlemen farmers’ and create the foundation of 
an incipient civil society. The Muslims, with exceptions, occupied the lower rungs of 
society, and engaged themselves in agriculture and cognate pursuits. The communal 
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division of labour also reinforced the different socio-economic identities between 
Hindus and Muslims in Bengal.  
 
At the same time, the British introduced a hierarchical education system aimed 
at creating a group of lower echelon of civilian bureaucrats who could manage the 
colonial state’s revenues. This further entrenched unequal conditions and 
opportunities, which led to the exclusion of Bengali Muslims from access to this 
western education.9 The relationship between the Muslim peasants and the Hindu 
Zamindars was to deteriorate further with the introduction of the 1793 Permanent 
Settlement, which created a new kind of land tenure system. This provided for a 
peasant to be a tenant on the land that he cultivated without ownership rights such that 
he could easily be evicted. An absence of strong laws made it convenient for the 
Zamindars to exploit tenants in order to maximize revenues (Day 1874; Eaton 1993, 
p.261-2). At the same time, Zamindars made every possible effort to exclude peasant 
from gaining access to western education. This occurred even at the primary school 
level until 1939, when a Muslim provincial government enacted free primary school 
education for the rural masses in Bengal.10  
 
 Just after a hundred years of rule, the British were forced to rethink their 
British India policy after the revolt of 1857, led mostly by the Hindu princely states. 
The British had realized that the Muslims, whom they had earlier defeated in 1757, 
were now no longer a threat. In a new twist to the colonial ‘divide and rule policy’,11 
they began more explicitly playing both sides off against each other. British officials 
and scholars such as William W. Hunter (1872) began to rethink their position in 
relation to the Muslims of the state. The introduction of cash crops such as jute, 
cotton, and tobacco was strengthening the position of the peasants and the British saw 
the potential of this up and coming Muslim cultivator class of Jotedars (rich farmers) 
in their new strategy. A new land law enacted in 1859 ensured the ownership of land 
for those cultivators who had held the land for twelve consecutive years, and forbade 
rent hike and unlawful evictions. These new laws created tension and unrest and 
increased awareness amongst the Jotedars about their control and authority over the 
land. After more attempted rent hikes, an uprising took place in 1873.12  
 
By now, Jotedars had been placed on a more equal footing with the 
Zamindars. The British policy initiatives and new land ownership laws had been 
critical in helping them realise their potential as a political force. A more self-
assertive Jotedars class began to attempt to free themselves from dependency on the 
Zamindars. For the Jotedar, then, political society had become a precondition for the 
protection of land ownership (Macpherson 1962). Implicitly they challenged their 
status as subjects and demanded the freedom of property and individual rights in 
accordance with the possessive quality of the bourgeoisie law of ownership. It was 
also similarly clear to the Jotedars that without western education and the precise 
                                                 
9 English Education Act of 1935, Government of India, 1872. See Chandra (2009). 
10 Two Years of Provincial Autonomy in Bengal, Being a Report of the Work Done by the Government of Bengal 
from 1st of April 1939 to 31st March 1940, Alipore: Bengal Government Press, 1939, p.xii. 
11 Appeasing one community against other, as Hindus were made to stand against Muslims before 1857, and viewing 
this new perception of threat, Muslims were set against the Hindus in post-1857 policies. 
12 William W. Hunter (1872) argued that the Hindus in every branch of government had the upper hand over 
Muslims (Hunter, 1872, p.171–2).  
11 
knowledge of the law of property, they would not be able to challenge the all-
powerful Zamindar class, as Rahim pointed (1992, p.316):  
 
‘For the Jotedars, then, education was not a means to earn a living, but was 
rather a means for self-assertion’ against the feudal economic system’. 
 
Census reports after 1872 began to classify tenure holders (such as Jotedars 
and Talukdars) into occupational categories of cultivators. Thus it is not possible or 
correct to compute from these records the proportions of Jotedars as Hindus or 
Muslims. However, the census reports indicate that there certainly was a majority of 
Muslims who dominated the agricultural sector in East Bengal, and that most of the 
rich farmers were also Muslims (Rahim 2007). With the foundation of the peasant 
economy, an incipient Muslim middle class therefore emerged under the tutelage of 
the colonial state, which had formerly patronized the Hindu middle classes during the 
early nineteenth century. To encourage the Muslims to participate fully in the affairs 
of the State, the school curriculum was considerably revamped.13 Persian and Arabic 
languages were introduced at the secondary level. In addition, Farsi was included 
along with other subjects, such as Sanskrit, in the post-secondary examinations 
(Mahmood 1985). Social insecurity created by colonial underdevelopment also 
reinforced political competition between Hindus and the Muslims as they struggled to 
control limited resources. Not only did politics reinforce religious identity, but 
religion was also to later shape the evolution of nation-state ideology. Fears of Hindu 
domination created the conditions for building communal Islamic organizations that 
could help to unify Bengali Muslims.  
 
From this point onwards, religious identity became a central aspect of political 
mobilization in colonial India. Religious identity formations were inextricably 
connected to the dynamics of the land ownership. As we have seen, the Hindu 
political class was mostly constituted by the Zamindars and an educated middle class, 
whereas the Muslims were farmers and a newly-emerged class of Jotedars. These 
identity constructions were later to be crucial for the creation of Bangladesh. Bengali 
Muslims from the Jotedar class consolidated themselves as a political force during the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, as English education became a passport to 
upward mobility. They emerged as a vocal political force for social and economic 
reforms in Muslim Bengal, which were opposed by many Hindus and by some of 
small Muslim feudal class (Rahim 2007). In the first half of the twentieth century, a 
vernacular elite emerged from these Muslim cultivators that produced leaders such as 
A. Q. Fazlul Haque, Abul Hashim, H. S. Suhrawardy and M.H. Bhashani who became 
the political voices of the lower economic class of the Muslims in Bengal. These new 
political elites saw no contradiction in being Bengali and Muslim, and this meant that 
a distinction became clearer between the Urdu language speaking up-country 
Muslims, and these Muslims who were loyal to the Bengali language and a distinctive 
Bengali cultural heritage. In the later years, these Bengali speaking Muslim Leaders 
were behind the evolution of an ethno-cultural nationalism (Sen 2002). By contrast, it 
was Urdu speaking East Bengali Muslim leaders such as Kwaza Nazimuddin and 
M.A. Ispahani who were among the most prominent supporters of the idea of 
Pakistan. Indian Muslim nationalism, then, was not homogenous - rather, it reflected a 
                                                 
13 Bengal, Calcutta University Commission, 1917–19, Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing (1919, p. 
229). 
12 
set of regional and linguistic tendencies. Beneath the coating of the Islamic 
brotherhood, argued the Bengali Muslim intelligentsia, there lay a profound cultural 
and linguistic distinction between a Bengali Muslim and a Muslim from upper India 
(Sen 1976).  
 
 
Shaping political and religious frontiers 
 
The Partition of Bengal in 1905, and the formation of the Indian Muslim League in 
1906 were the two most significant events of a period that could be considered the key 
moment of increased politico-religious consciousness among Bengali Muslims in 
British India. As a large and potentially troublesome territory, Bengal province had 
attracted the attention of the British government during the later half of the nineteenth 
century. Early in 1903 Sir Andrew Fraser, governor of Bengal, propounded a scheme 
in which the idea for the partition of Bengal began tot take shape. The main argument 
was that the territories lying in the eastern section of the province were poorly 
administered and needed more attention from government. Amrit Bazar Patrika wrote 
on December 14, 1903 that the government wished to weaken the Bengali nation by 
placing it under two administrations, and ‘The Bengali’ newspaper described it as a 
manifestation of the policy of ‘divide and rule’.14  It was at this stage that Muslim 
politics in Bengal took a new turn. Nawab Salimullah emerged as a leader of the 
Muslim community, especially of East Bengal. He supported the Partition scheme 
(1905) and organized a movement in its favour. On the other side, Lord Curzon 
himself toured East Bengal in February 1904 and addressed public meetings at 
Chittagong, Dhaka and Mymensingh. Speaking at Dhaka on February 18, 1904, he 
declared:   
 
‘Partition would make Dhaka the centre and possibly the capital of a new self 
sufficing administration which must give to the people of these districts by reason of 
their numerical strength and their superior culture the preponderating voice in the 
province so created, which would invest the Mohammedans in eastern Bengal with a 
unity which they have since the days of the old Musalmaan Vice-Roy and kings’.15  
 
From this it was clear that the British were going to show special favours to 
the Muslims of East Bengal by creating a new Muslim majority province.  
 
Later, while many Muslims of Bengal supported the Pakistan cause, there was 
apprehension. A.K. Fazlul Haq called for more than one state for the Muslims of 
India, thereby securing Bengali Muslims rights and interests in Bengal (Ayoob, 1975, 
p.2-3). It was the ‘two-nation theory’, which Fazlul Haque was made to present and 
was known as the Lahore Resolution of 1940 of All India Muslim League. The 
Lahore Resolution gave the Bangladesh people a concrete framework or a base in 
which they developed the idea for a separate Muslim state for East Bengalis. 
However, his 'two nations' were based on the Pakistan proposal, which had originally 
been plural in nature - and hence the term ‘states’ has been used rather than ‘state’. 
Later, this idea was not pursued strongly and by 1946, it was accepted as a mere 
grammatical error. In fact, this resolution was moved as a tool to attain the dream of 
                                                 
14 The Bengali, 15th January, 1904. 
15 Curzon’s Speeches, Volume 3, pp. 303-4. 
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an independent Muslim state by the All-India Muslim League (AIML) leadership in 
1940. They had carefully mobilized the Bengali Muslim leaders for the self-reliance 
of the Bengali Muslims, and extended their political support to the Fazlul Haque 
government to cultivate their rural mass base. When the Indian National Congress 
(INC) withdrew their support, the Muslim League extended legislative support to the 
most popular leader of rural Bengal, Fazlul Haque to make a uniform Muslim 
movement for one state. In fact, Jinnah had little support from rural Bengali Muslims, 
except from a few Calcutta-based Urdu-speaking Muslim leaders such as Nazimuddin 
and Ispahani (Sen, 1976, p.32-33). Later, H. S. Suhrawardy was to also play a critical 
role in the Direct Action Day for Pakistan. After riots took place in Noakhali and 
Calcutta, differences between Hindus and Muslims widened. As a result, the Bengali 
Hindu community began to strongly oppose the idea of a united Bengal that had been 
raised at the last minute of Partition of India by some leaders.16  Congress supported 
the division of Bengal in 1947, exactly on the grounds on which it had opposed its 
division earlier.17  
 
Politically, the idea of United Bengal was an appealing one to some Muslim 
leaders, but the attainment of economic progress was a dominant concern of the 
Muslim peasant class of Bengal. One can argue that besides their economic status, the 
Muslims of Bengal were essentially provincialists, rather than nationalists or 
separatists.18 The Bengali Muslims were neither apprehensive of capturing political 
power in a democratic set up at the provincial level (being 55 per cent), nor did they 
fear Hindu domination in politics as did the pre-partition Urdu-speaking Muslim 
leadership. Finally, they enthusiastically supported the Two Nation Theory (TNT) 
based on Muslim nationalism in 1947. Hence, in the partition of Bengal, economic 
factors were the main drivers in the political and religious mobilization of the 
Muslims. 
 
Islamic nationalists forces were always present to some extent in Bengal. This 
fact could be analysed from the partition of Bengal in 1905 and the partition of India 
in 1947.19 A section of Bengali Muslims regarded the annulment of Partition in 1911 
as a victory of Hindu dominance over Bengali Muslims.20 The same section of East 
Bengal was later to support the idea of Pakistan. In fact, the emergence of Bangladesh 
on December 16, 1971 was the culmination of Bengali nationalist struggle, launched 
in early twentieth century, to establish a separate identity. This was an identity not 
only distinct from the Hindu majority of the province, but also distinct from their co-
                                                 
16 It should be noted that Suhrawarthy’s love for ‘United Bengal’ was a direct outcome of his having been passed 
over for the leadership of the East Bengal Muslim League Parliamentary Party, even though he had been Prime Minister of 
undivided Bengal until Partition. The Leader of the EBML Parliamentary Party ipso facto become the Chief Minister of the 
Pakistan province of East Bengal. 
17 For the details of politics involving this division, see Harun ur Rashid (2003, pp. 257-329). Abul Hashim and Sarat 
Chandra Bose had talked of a 50-50 sharing of power by the Hindus.  
18 These terms have contextual relevance. ‘Provincialist’ is used in terms of a Bengali identity, ‘nationalist’ is used to 
refer to Islam as an identity and separatist is used to denote their ambitions in terms of political future. However all these 
references underwent various political transformations. 
19 In 1905, the British divided Bengal in two parts. West Bengal was the Hindu majority province, and East Bengal 
had a Muslim majority.  
20 The creation of IML was moreover was a result of the partition of Bengal, where a section of Bengali Muslims felt 
humiliated by the opposition of division of Bengal by Indian National Congress. 
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religionists in other regions of India (Haston 1994). Some scholars argue that this 
Bengali Muslim consciousness has roots as far back as the thirteenth century, with the 
conquest of Mohammad Bakthiyar (Osmany 1992). Many scholars believe that there 
were always fundamental cultural, religious dissimilarities between the two 
civilizations of India, Hindu and Muslim, even in Bengal (Sayed 1960). Nevertheless, 
it is clear from the study of Bengal that economic factors had conditioned a far more 
differentiated set of secular, cultural-linguistic, and religious identities among East 
Bengalis than was found in other parts of the Subcontinent. 
 
 
Contesting identities in the united Pakistan 
 
The separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 was not merely a case of 
geographical secession. It fundamentally challenged the very concept of two nations 
on which Pakistan was created, i.e. the idea that Hindu and Muslims of undivided 
India formed two distinct nations. A logical corollary of this theory was that the 
Muslim majority areas of the sub-continent should be constituted as a single nation, 
and it was on this basis that the monolithic state structure of Pakistan was established 
in 1947. Yet the new state embodied a set of internal cultural, linguistic and, above 
all, politico-economic contradictions that ultimately culminated in East Bengal’s 
struggle for separation. 
 
Many analysts viewed the emergence of an independent state of Bangladesh in 
1971 as merely the implementation of the original 1940 Lahore Resolution, 
suggesting that this proved that poet philosopher Mohammed Iqbal’s concept of 
Pakistan was more sound than politician Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s view of the Muslim 
homeland (Ayoob 1973). This assessment was based on the evidence that in his 
famous Presidential address at the Muslim League Session of 1930, Iqbal had 
declared:  
 
‘I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and 
Baluchistan amalgamated in to a single state. Self-government within British empire 
or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian 
Muslim States appears to me to be the finally destiny of Muslim at least of the north-
west India’.21  
 
Originally, Bengal had had little or no place in Iqbal’s scheme of things. It was 
only later on in his correspondence with Jinnah, dated June 21, 1937, that the poet-
philosopher seems to have become interested in the Indian Muslim Community 
(Ahmed 1970). The key visionary of the idea of Pakistan, Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, had 
also not considered Bengal as a part of Pakistan, referring to Bengal as Bang-e-Islam, 
and a Muslim majority state separate from his Pakistan. Ali’s view of Pakistan was 
essentially the same as that in Iqbal’s 1930 address, but with the single addition of 
Kashmir (Hussain 2000). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Indian Annual Register (Calcutta), July-December 1930, pp. 337-38. 
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Two nation theory and Bengali Muslim identities 
 
The Lahore Resolution of 1940 seemed to find a modus vivendi between the ideas 
expressed by Iqbal, and those expressed by Jinnah and other leaders of Muslim 
minority provinces, particularly U.P. While the Resolution talked in terms of ‘Muslim 
India’ as if it could be considered a single whole, Sayeed (1969, p.106) writes that the 
operative part of the resolution declared that  
 
‘The areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-
western and eastern zone of India, should be grouped to be constitute ‘independent 
states’ in which the continent units shall be autonomous and sovereign’.  
 
It was not until 1946, when the Muslim League Legislatures Convention was 
held in Delhi, that the League officially endorsed the concept of single state of 
Pakistan comprising both the north-western and eastern Muslim majority zones. Even 
at that time, there were voices of dissent raised, principally by Abul Hashim, the then 
Secretary of the Bengal branch of the Muslim League (Ayoob 1973). But these 
voices, though prophetic, were at that time merely cries in the wilderness, since the 
emotional commitment to Pakistan that had been created by Jinnah and the Muslim 
League was now too strong to resist.  
 
 Differences of opinion over the two nation theory can also be traced back to 
two separate strands of Islamic thinking which took shape in the nineteenth century: 
one based around Aligarh, and another Deoband (Episoto 1986). The Aligarhist strand 
was revisionist and liberal, committed to the reworking of the ideas of Islam so as to 
be relevant both to the socio-economic and political imperatives of pluralistic 
societies containing differing ethnic and cultural minorities, and to the economic and 
technological demands of an emerging modern world. In terms of the Aligarhist spirit, 
Islam did not stand in contradiction to the organisational principles of the nation-state 
or of parliamentary democracy, despite the frequency of such a claim by some 
mullahs and other religious clergy (Piscatori 1986). M. A. Jinnah drew inspiration 
from Islam from this particular tradition.22 
 
The tradition that was associated with the seminary at Deoband was concerned 
with an essentially medieval, hierarchical view of Islam, based upon the powers of the 
clergy. It saw the Muslim community as a distinct whole, immune from other 
divisions and competing loyalties and from the artificial identities and symbols of the 
nation-state. Initially, many Deobandian scholars rejected the calls for a Pakistani 
state on the grounds that the ideas of national exclusiveness stood in contradiction to a 
pan-Islamic identity. Maulana Azad, a liberal Muslim who remained within the INC 
and served in the government of independent India, noted in his biography that ‘it is 
one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite 
areas which are geographically, linguistically and culturally different’ (Gandhi 1987). 
Having reluctantly accepted Partition, the Deobandian tradition came to dominate the 
Islamic political parties in the form of Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam.23  
                                                 
22 Just before his death, Jinnah had outlined his vision of the future Pakistan based upon a parliamentary system of 
government, in which ‘Hindu, Muslim and Christians could become good citizens of Pakistan’. With such little explicit reference 
to Islam within the 1956 Constitution, cynical eyebrows were raised both in New Delhi, and within Pakistan itself. 
23 It was later to oppose the creation of Bangladesh as an independent state. 
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These organizations, with differing emphases and slightly differing policies, took up 
the task of creating a real ‘Islamic society’ based upon the codification of the Shari’at. 
They favoured the sanctioning of religious authority through the teachings and tenants 
of Sunni orthodoxy with regards to language (the use of Urdu), strict punishment for 
adultery and theft, and held with Islamic ideals of interest, taxes and economic 
development (Hewitt 1992).  
 
The East Bengal middle class soon realized that one could not live by religion 
alone. They faced both economic exploitation and lack of political voice within the 
new country. Pakistan’s power structure was heavily loaded in favour of West 
Pakistan, and particularly its Punjab and Mohajirs elites, such that any politically 
conscious Bengali felt an acute degree of political exclusion. Combined with the 
geographical distance between the two wings of Pakistan, and the linguistic 
differences, demand grew for a degree of autonomous existence for East Pakistan’s 
people, demands that were not acceptable to the central government. 
 
 
Socio-cultural differences and economic disparities 
 
In the united Pakistan, the state began introducing measures that would consolidate its 
hold over Bengali Muslims. Initially, the attempt had been made to define Pakistani 
citizens’ identity in terms of religion. It was presumed that a religious identity would 
supersede other primordial identities and hold the disparate nation together. In theory, 
a state can mobilise people based on a single identity. But to make this into a political 
reality, and to sustain it beyond sub-national identities would have required a more 
egalitarian approach that was on offer, one that would be able to address the political 
aspirations and economic grievances that arise among different ethno-linguistic 
groups.24  Instead, in 1948, Jinnah declared Urdu to be state language, ignoring the 
fact the Bengalis were a distinct group of Muslims whose political and social 
aspirations required proper recognition within the new state of Pakistan. Instead of 
building a bridge to work with Bengali Muslim political elites on the difficult cultural 
and economic issues that were becoming apparent, the West Pakistan-dominated 
Muslim League leaders began redefining Pakistan’s political culture through an 
authoritarian approach and an emphasis on Persianized and Arabized religion and 
culture (deVotta 2001). The League leadership was in favour of making Urdu25 the 
sole national language for all of Pakistan, despite the fact that Urdu was a minority 
language spoken by a tiny fraction of the ruling elites, who had migrated from Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar and settled in Karachi. In a self-assigned civilizing mission, Urdu 
was to be the medium of instruction at primary, secondary and tertiary levels of 
education and the Bengali script was to be replaced by the Arabic script.26 This would 
have serious implications for educated Bengalis who had to compete for government 
jobs with their counterparts from West Pakistan, who would now have to learn two 
languages: English and Urdu, in addition to Bengali.  
 
                                                 
24 In discussion with Athar Hussain, Director, Asia Research Centre, LSE, London, UK. 
25 The raison d’être for making Urdu the sole national language was, however, a deeply embedded feeling rooted in 
Indian Islam. Urdu had developed under the patronage of the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal Empire (1192–1800 AD). It was part 
of the Arabic, Persian and Turkish heritages, and seen as representing Islam par excellence. See Smith (1946, p.97). 
26 The Dawn, 19th February, 1949; 21st March, 1951 (cited in Rahim, 1986: 380–3). 
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At the same time, the prospect of getting better jobs and a better future 
remained a distant hope, due to the siphoning off of economic resources from East to 
West Pakistan (Nations 1971). The government established an Adult Education 
Centre and allocated substantial funds to impart education in Bengali language 
through Arabic script.27 Simultaneously, efforts were made to encourage Bengali 
Muslim writers to write in Chalit Bhasa28 as an attempt to get rid of the influence of 
‘sanskritised’ words in Bengali literature. By April 1951, the government had spent 
around Rs60,000 on efforts to examine whether literacy could be achieved quickly 
with the introduction of an Arabic script (Murshid 1996). 
 
On 21st February 1952, the government’s violent repression of the Language 
Movement revived Bengali cultural nationalistic feelings. From the mid-1950s 
onwards, secular and democratic forces gained expression of their dissatisfaction with 
the status quo under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.29 Pakistan’s minority 
communities, which made up 10 per cent of the total population, had also become a 
powerful critical force, since they also wanted to play a role in national politics.30  The 
Awami League (AL), which by that time was gaining popularity, picked this issue up 
alongside the principle of language. In 1955, secular forces within the AL revoked an 
earlier decision of the party so that it was now opened to all citizens of Pakistan 
irrespective of their creed, caste and religion. The name of the party was then changed 
from Awami Muslim League to the National Awami League. With grassroots support 
from both the main communities, the AL emerged as a mass political party. It was to 
become the first political party to make a major breakthrough in the communal 
politics of the State. 
 
The most prominent issue for the people of East Pakistan was economic 
deprivation, exacerbated by government discrimination in resource allocations 
between West and Eastern wings. West Pakistan’s policies had brought about 
disparities in the economies between the two wings of Pakistan, and between 1949-50 
and 1969-70 the economy of West Pakistan grew at a faster rate than that of East 
Pakistan. East Pakistan contributed heavily to foreign exchange earnings through the 
export of its raw jute and jute goods, which constituted over 90 per cent of the total 
export earnings of Pakistan. Yet West Pakistan was accounting for the bulk of the 
foreign exchange used for investment and industrialization. The famous Six Point 
                                                 
27 A sixteen member committee was formed on 9th March 1949 under the chairmanship of Maulana Akram Khan. 
This committee submitted its report on 7th December 1950, and rejected the introduction of Arabic script in Bengali. 
28 Chalit Bhasa was more of a local language spoken in the Muslim dominated East Bengal. Contrary to this Sadhu 
Bhasa was more of  a ‘sanskritised’ language that is used by the Bengali Hindus. This debate was more relevant with regard to 
the quality of language in which prose was composed. In this context the perceived dichotomy between the two communities 
witnessed the flourishing of punthi literature as a challenge to Sadhu Bhasa.  
29 Alam (1991) analyses the role played by the 1952 Language Movement (bhasha andolan) in East Bengal in the 
development of a Bengali nationalist discourse. The Language Movement forged a conscious link between various subaltern 
social groups, enabling them to transcend existing barriers and transform them into formidable political actors. Using the 
Gramscian concept of counter-hegemonic striving, this paper argues that the language movement was a definitive outcome of 
years of counter hegemonic activities of the Bengali subalterns.  This process of counter hegemony was especially evident in the 
peasant insurgency in rural areas, and in the building of an alternative political organization. The articulation of political power 
through these two processes stands in sharp contrast to the efforts of the Muslim League, both ideologically and politically. 
30 The question of a joint electorate was not a contested issue in the 1954 provincial election and no reference was 
made to it in the famous 21 Point Programme. 
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Programme had argued for the removal of this economic disparity between the two 
wings. 
 
Bengali commitment to Pakistan had been predicated on the assumption that 
they would exercise autonomy at the regional level and share power at the federal 
level, but they found themselves betrayed almost from the start of the new Pakistan. 
In a heavily centralized system, power was concentrated among the West Pakistan-
based elite. This elite used its power to plunder resources from East Bengal, 
monopolized external aid, and channelled state resources to West Pakistan, ostensibly 
in a programme to build social equality. But this programme demanded the 
suppression of democracy and the denial of autonomy to the provinces, and East 
Pakistan in particular. An emphasis on religious identity was used as a façade to 
conceal the Punjab-centric identity of the new Pakistani state. The struggles for 
democracy, regional autonomy, social justice, secularism and nationalism therefore 
coalesced within the broader struggle for self-rule for East Pakistan.31  The creation of 
Bangladesh’s national identity must therefore be viewed within the historical context 
that led to creation of an independent state. 
 
 
Contesting identities in the new state of Bangladesh 
 
The policies and programmes of Fazlul Haq within undivided India, and later those of 
H.S. Suhrawardy, Maulana Bhashani, Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman, each 
played a decisive role in the evolution of Bengali Muslim politics. The origins of the 
idea of Bangladesh lay in successive identity-related conflicts. The first of these 
conflicts, associated with religious identities, first led to East Bengal’s separation 
from the body politic of India and from West Bengal within Pakistan. The second 
conflict, associated with East Pakistan’s political, linguistic and cultural identity, 
culminated in the subsequent division of Pakistan in 1971 and the creation of 
Bangladesh. In the first decades of independence, further differences of perception 
and ideology among Bangladeshi leaders went on to shape these identities further 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
The disappearance of the ‘second colonial rulers’, that had attempted to weld 
the disparate communities of Pakistan into a nation, showed the importance of 
primordial cultural-linguistic identities. Mujib went on to shape the new nation on the 
basis of his ‘four pillars’ - democracy, socialism, secularism and Bengali nationalism 
- the basic principles of the freedom struggle of Bangladesh. By contrast, the narrower 
policy perspectives of the anti-Mujib leaders such as Maulana Bhasani and General 
Ziaur Rahman (who seized power in a coup in 1975) emphasized a different kind of 
nationalism that had Islam its core.32 Bhasani’s policies were based on ideas of 
‘Islamic socialism’, and in one of his meetings he declared that he would ‘trample the 
Constitution underfoot, if it is not based on the Quran and the practices of the 
Prophet’ (Chakravarty 1995). Contrary to Mujib’s policies of secularism, he 
advocated a narrower form of communalism, based on an anti-Hindu ethos that was 
closer to that found in the idea of Pakistan. He criticized Mujib for making 
Bangladesh into a satellite of Hindu India, attempting to forge a united front between 
                                                 
31 Discussion with Rehman Sobhan, Dhaka; also see Sobhan (2006). 
32  This was to become known as ‘Bangladeshi nationalism’. 
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extremists of right and left against the forces of secularism. The debate on state and 
religion became an issue when the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh stated that 
secularism was the fourth pillar of state policy. The idea of making secularism33 part 
of state policy followed logically from the freedom struggle in which Bengalis sought 
to establish a democratic country based on secular values.  
 
The essential strength of a secular society is that it reduces the significance of 
primordial factors such as religion, ethnicity, and caste within national identity 
construction, influencing political choice and delineating economic opportunities.34 
Elevation of any such primordial factor to a significance that constrains opportunities 
or incites violence is inimical to the construction of a secular society. Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman defined secularism in a distinctive way. For him secularism neither implied 
the absence of religion, nor any repudiation of Islam. He argued that it was a way to 
protect people against the influence of Islamic extremists. In Pakistan, religion had 
been used as a tool to establish and sustain dictatorship for more than a decade, and 
this was very well understood by the AL leadership. The repudiation of secularism by 
the Pakistani state inspired a culture of exclusion that eroded democratic values and 
arguably culminated in the genocide of 1971. 
  
Under Bangladesh’s Constitution, Article 38 prohibited politics based on 
religion. Under this provision, religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islam were banned. 
The aim was to build a society based on national and public welfare that would negate 
communalism as a political force. Mujib believed that the religious ideology of Islam 
could be retained within a spirit of secularism. In order to publicise this, he re-instated 
the old practice of daily recitals from holy books of different religions on national 
radio and television. The idea was that Mujib’s rule would be based on ‘multi-
theocracy’ (Maniruzzaman 1990). 
 
All this created an era of religious and cultural disagreement amongst different 
religious ‘stakeholders’. The idea of setting up a new cooperative farming system 
upset rich rural cultivators, and the creation of the Rakhi Bahini, a paramilitary force 
between the government and army, displeased the Armed Forces. Mujib’s 
authoritarianism during the later years of his rule, such as the abolition of civil 
liberties and the introduction of a new one-party system, also undermined liberal 
democrats in the country. In addition to each of the above, the comprehensive failure 
of the government deliver economic progress, the controlled hoarding of food, 
corruption and cronyism, led to widespread disillusionment and resulted in Mujib’s 
assassination in 1975. The new nation then became plunged into a period of multiple 
coups that were to lead on to a decade and a half of military dictatorship. The anti-
colonial nationalistic hegemony faded, and General Zia’s military regime began to 
consolidate state power by harping back to issues of religion. 
 
General Ziaur Rahman, in the process of consolidating his political power 
base, took the steps that began to transform Bengali culture and polity along more 
                                                 
33 The Constitution does not precisely conceptualize the idea of secularism but suggests it may be realised through 
the elimination of: (a) communalism in all its forms; (b) the granting of official status to any religion; (c) the prohibition of the 
use of religion for political purposes; (d) any discrimination against, or persecution of, persons practicing a particular religion. 
34 These could be essential features for an individual’s identity but not for a secular state (personal communication 
with Rehman Sobhan, Dhaka). 
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communal lines. Religious politics took shape in Bangladesh, with the amendment of 
Article 38 of the Constitution. The word ‘secularism’ was deleted, and a new 
provision incorporated ‘to place full Faith in Almighty Allah’, by amending article 8 
(1) of the Constitution. It had also introduced the words ‘Bismillahir Rahamnur 
Rahim’ at the top of the preamble. The ‘struggle for national Liberation’ was replaced 
by the ‘war for national Independence’. Socialism was redesigned to conform to the 
Islamic idea of social justice. A new clause was added to Article 25(2) relating to 
‘Islamic solidarity’, which allowed the cultivation of fraternal relations among 
Muslim countries.35 These changes were aimed at downplaying the role of Mujib and 
the Awami League in securing Independence. The military regime therefore rejected 
linguistic nationalism in favour of a territorial Islamic nationalism. This attempted to 
forge a new national identity for the people of Bangladesh by making a clearer 
distinction between the Bengalis of India’s West Bengal, and those in Bangladesh. 
From this point, the citizens of Bangladesh were described as ‘Bangladeshis’ (Article 
6). This brand of Bangladeshi nationalism was also constructed by the regime 
primarily to divert attention from the government’s failure to deliver meaningful 
change. The process of Islamisation served the purpose of trying to avert a legitimacy 
crisis in the face of a weakening economy and persistence of mass poverty.36  This 
eventually opened the floodgates for other leaders, such as General H.M. Ershad 
during the 1980s, to continue using religion as a tool for political purposes. 
 
While there is no doubt that Islam was used politically by these leaders, the 
critical issue is to understand how deeply this ‘Islamisation’ process has in fact gone.  
One of its effects was the attempt to rehabilitate a number of prominent 
‘collaborators’ accused in 1971 of involvement in the killing of intellectuals and other 
civilians. Indeed, a majority of these collaborators had come from the religious 
political parties. They began using every religious occasion to chastise Bangladesh’s 
liberals and secularists for abandoning Islam and the Prophet and accepting Hindu 
Bengali Rabindronath Tagore as a cultural figurehead. By invoking these slogans, the 
right-wing establishment succeeded in transferring its communalism into the 
Bangladeshi brand of nationalism. On the basis of an anti-Mujib ideology, the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was founded in 1978. Similarly, the second 
military regime, General H M. Ershad continued his predecessor’s policy with 
enthusiasm. Indeed, he went one step further by declaring ‘Islam as state religion’ of 
Bangladesh.37  The Bangladesh masses had struggled against an Islamic brand of 
nationalism in 1971 to secure a Bengali cultural-linguistic identity, but the subsequent 
military regimes gradually helped bring an Islamic identity into Bangladeshi politics. 
 
 
The growth of an Islamic politics 
 
The onset of democracy during the 1990s did not alter the trends set in place by the 
military regimes significantly, and there was an increased incidence of terrorist 
                                                 
35 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, The Government of the Republic of 
Bangladesh, 1979. 
36 Hashmi (2003) argues that the successors of Mujib adopted Islam after the failure of both the welfare state and the 
promised socialist utopia. 
37 Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, The Constitution of People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, 
Government of the Republic of Bangladesh. 
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activities, extremism and communalism in Bangladesh grew during the 2000s. A key 
change was that in the BNP government of 2001-6, fundamentalist forces had 
increasingly begun to occupy legitimate political space as the ideals of the Liberation 
movement faded.  
 
The BNP has always been associated with an ideology of ‘Bangladeshi 
nationalism’ in contrast to the ‘Bengali Nationalism’ traditionally associated with the 
AL. After the 2001 elections, there was a tremendous rise in the attacks on minorities, 
moderate Muslims and liberal democratic forces including opposition politicians. The 
BNP-led governing coalition included Islamist parties, most notably the Jamaat-i-
Islami. Islamic groups such as the Islamic Chattra Shibir and HUJI-B gained 
legitimacy within the political landscape of Bangladesh. This was a very significant 
change as forces that had once been shunned as collaborators had now managed to 
occupy mainstream political space. The same period was also witnessed a rise in 
terrorist training camps. The existence of Islamist militant groups such as Jamat-ul-
Mujahideen-Bangladesh (with a close link to Afghan Jihadis) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-
Islami Bangladesh (linked to Al-Qaeda) in Bangladesh have consolidated and 
expanded their institutional trans-border networks. In certain quarters scholars began 
wondering if ‘Talibanization’ of Bangladesh was underway (e.g. Karlekar 2006). In 
fact, the characteristics of this change was perceived that the ethos and the ideology of 
the movement for autonomy and the Liberation struggle were no longer relevant in 
Bangladeshi politics, and the re-emergence of Islam as a factor considered necessary 
to consolidate political power in Bangladesh. The marginalization and disappearance 
of the left of centre and leftist parties from Bangladesh’s political scene were a 
setback to the moderate forces in the country (Dixit 2001). It is interesting that after 
2006 this has become less prevalent, and that accounts of Bangladesh’s 
‘talibanization’ now seem somewhat alarmist. 
 
The rise of Islamic extremism was fuelled by continuing economic 
underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment. Bangladesh remains predominantly 
an agriculture-based society, with more than forty per cent population is still bellow 
poverty line. Unemployed immigrants such as Rohigiyya refugees were 
systematically targeted and taken advantage of by religious fundamentalist forces. 
These domestic factors, and the influence of international Islamic actors, both 
provided a rationale for exploiting illiterate and unemployed youth to promote Islamic 
extremism, including within an expanding Madrasa sector.  
 
The factors beyond Islamic revivalism and intolerance in Bangladesh lie 
mainly within macro, meso and micro layers of within Bangladesh society and polity. 
At the macro level, the socio-political elites of the society have used Islamism for 
political purposes to hold state power and divert from problems of mass poverty and 
unemployment. In this process, external actors, using petro-dollars from Middle East 
countries, have imposed their version of Islamism through the work of charities to 
strengthen a Madrasa culture and patronise mosques. The dominance of Middle 
Eastern Islam (Hanabli) has contributed ideas of intolerance among the Muslims of 
Bangladesh (Hanafi). At the meso (intermediate) level, a decline of scholarship in the 
Islamic academic sector and inability of mainstream religious civil society, 
particularly mosque-based educated mullahs, to reveal the true version of Islam to the 
society, has led to confusion among some Muslims. At the micro level, increased 
migration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers to the Middle East has favoured 
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efforts to impose an ‘authentic’ Middle Eastern version of Islam over Hanafi society, 
as migrants return home to predominantly poor and illiterate communities in 
Bangladesh. 
 
 
Islamic politics versus secularism   
 
Secular forms of politics remain inculcated within the thought processes of 
mainstream political parties in Bangladesh, reflected in their slogans and manifestos. 
During the ninth parliamentary elections in 2008, the Awami League promised that 
the use of religion and communalism in politics would be banned if elected, with 
courtesy and tolerance restored to the political culture of the country.38 By contrast, 
the BNP’s alliance partner Jamaat-e-Islam, the proponent of a stronger Islamic 
identity, stated that if elected it would enact a ‘blasphemy law’ to prevent anti-
religious statements and criticism of religion in books, newspapers and electronic 
media (Kumar 2009). Most importantly, the Jamaat emphasized giving military 
training to citizens aged between 20 and 30 gradually under the supervision of the 
defence forces.39 Jamaat did not clarify the intention behind such training, but it made 
many people worried since Islamist organizations have generally given this kind of 
training to promote militancy. The BNP-led political alliance had been largely 
responsible for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and it had neglected to combat 
Islamic extremism in the last decade.  
 
When the AL won the election with a landslide, the results seemed to indicate 
a rejection of the Jamaat-e-Islami brand of Islamic revivalism in Bangladesh. The 
Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina promised to the people of Bangladesh to bring 
about change, and the younger generation had been a key factor in the left leaning 
secularist's alliance election victory. Hasina used the language a change from darkness 
to light, from the shrouds of graft and corruption, violence and militancy to the light 
of a modern, secular and democratic country. She particularly emphasised the idea re-
instating ‘the spirit of 1971’. The AL won 262 seats out of 300 parliamentary seats, 
and these new MPs are entrusted with the onus of opening a new era in the history of 
Bangladesh. The mandate clearly shows that people of Bangladesh voted for a party, 
that won the country’s independence from Pakistan in the spirit of secularism. In the 
elections, the ‘forces of 1947’ were badly defeated by the believers of moderate 
democratic and secular principles. 40    
 
Historically, Bengali culture as we have seen, is mainly inclusive, tolerant and 
syncretic in nature. Time and again, these socio-cultural values have come under 
attack and suffered. People have struggled to maintain these basic values, from 
fighting the war against Pakistan in 1971, to more recently voting to power a secular 
alliance against the forces of intolerance in the 2008 Parliamentary Elections. A recent 
verdict in the Bangladesh High Court has directed the government to re-instate the 
original 1972 Constitution. The dangers of extremism have at least for now been 
                                                 
38 Election Manifesto of Bangladesh, Awami League, Ninth Parliamentary Elections 2008, at 
http://www.albd.org/autoalbd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=367&Itemid=1. 
39 ‘Polls Manifesto: Jamaat pledge blasphemy law’, The Daily Star, February 4th, 2008, 
http://www.thedailtstar.net/pf story. php?nid=667829. 
40 The ‘forces of 1947’ represent the ‘idea of Pakistan’, based on the principle of ‘Islamic nationalism’.
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sidestepped by the people of Bangladesh in this election. With an absolute majority in 
the parliament, the government has now changed the Islamic symbolism and re-
instated ‘Secularism’ (fifteenth amendment) within the constitution of Bangladesh. 
The consolidation of democracy, and the maintenance of a vibrant civil society, 
remains the best antidote for secular identity within Bangladeshi society. At the same 
time, while the tensions around identity remain as a fault line that runs through 
Bangladesh politics, other factors are also at play. For example, as Mushtaq Khan 
(2000) has shown, there is now a deep-rooted system of political patronage and 
alliance-building that allows each party to gain power and resources in rotation 
through electoral politics. In this model, he argues that religious and secular identities 
do not run very deep, and are just convenient political tools. The fact that the AL and 
the BNP have successfully alternated in government each election since 1991 suggests 
that this system is a resilient one.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The main argument of this working paper has centred on the idea that Bangladesh 
rests on a set of primordial socio-cultural, linguistic and religious identities that have 
been distinctively shaped by the history of the Bengal delta. The socio-economic 
system around which modern civilization has grown up in Bengal is derived from a 
distinctive cultural-religious ideology. As a result, relatively flexible religious 
ideologies were mobilized around the mode of production and economic life of the 
people. Subsequent attempts to construct a unique linguistic or religious identity 
within Bangladesh have tended to ignore the multiple identities around issues of 
language, class and profession, and this has occasionally served to provoke 
confrontation and violence.  
 
          The nationalist project has revolved around a recurring tension between two 
distinct ‘constructs’: the ‘Bengali’ and the ‘Bangladeshi’ identities. The ‘Bengali’ 
identity evolved largely due to two factors: first, on account of the syncretic secularist 
traditions that were present in the early history of Bengal; and second, from the 
Language Movement that arose in the early 1950s within East Pakistan. On the other 
hand, the ‘Bangladeshi’ identity was forged by taking recourse to Islamic loyalties 
that were initially crystallized during the movement for Pakistan, and then later by the 
process of Islamisation set in motion by the military regime of General Zia and later 
continued by General Ershad. Yet both two identities had exclusionary elements – the 
first towards non-Bengalis such as the Chakma and other tribal peoples found in the 
Hill Tracts and elsewhere, and non-Bengali ‘Biharis’ left over from Pakistan; and the 
second towards non-Muslims, who had long considered themselves to be Bengalis. A 
recognition of plural identities is needed to maintain a society which includes a 
mosaic of people of different creeds, communities, and political persuasions and 
enable them to live in harmony and tolerance. After the reintroduction of electoral 
democracy in 1991, more space opened up for political mobilization along religious 
lines, with the use of Islam by political parties such as the BNP and Jamaat-i-Islami to 
gain electoral benefits. The result was a state-sponsored Islamisation that has been 
deployed primarily to divert attention from the states failure to deliver solid benefits 
to its people. The outcome of the 9th Parliamentary Election has revived hopes that 
there are still strong sections of moderate Bengali secularist forces within civil society 
that both promote inclusive cultural values and resist a resurgence of Islamic 
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extremism. The majority of Bangladesh’s people and its civil society (including the 
majority of religious leaders) still hold  strong secular and inclusive cultural values. 
Finally, the paper has also argued that there is a correlation between an economically 
weaker Bangladesh and the resurgence of Islamism, and between greater prosperity 
and a reduction of Islamism. The international community should therefore continue 
to endeavour to help the country with its development. A secularist-linguistic-civic-
Bengali-nationalism is perfectly possible within the framework of Islam in 
Bangladesh if this long tradition of tolerance is re-imagined within the nationalistic 
hegemony.  
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